This paper reconciles industry conditions with the state of the economy in driving asset liquidation values and, therefore, recovery rates on defaulted debt securities.
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I. Introduction
One important cost of a firm's default comes from industry-wide downturns. First, times of depressed prospects in a firm's industry are invariably reflected in lower asset liquidation values. Intuitively, creditor recoveries will depend on the value of the debt collateral. But the collateral, and the economic worth of the defaulted firm's assets more generally, are expected to be revised downward in line with an industry downturn. Second, an industry downturn can impose an additional fire-sales discount on the assets of the defaulted firm, over and above its effect on fundamental value. In this view, the would-be buyers of liquidated assets are likely to be industry peers of the defaulted firm, who may not have the capacity to buy the liquidated assets because they are financially distressed too. Therefore, distress in the firm's industry limits its peers from bidding on the defaulted firm's assets up to their "value in best use" when managed by industry specialists. This market equilibrium approach was first developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) who described the difference between the price and the best-use value of an asset as "asset illiquidity". 1 Both of these effects limit the amount that creditors are able to recover from realized or anticipated liquidations of a firm's assets. If the adverse shock hitting the firm were purely idiosyncratic in nature -not industry-wide -then creditors would be better able to pool the costs of default. Thus, recovery risk -the chance of recovering less than the full amount of principal and accrued interest due given a default event -and its relation to industry conditions influences the ex-ante debt capacity of borrowing firms. 2 Ex post, significantly larger losses than anticipated by creditors can lead to a situation in which the hypothesized initial industry-wide shock makes the credit system itself more vulnerable to failure. Indeed, Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler, and Weiner (2006) maintain that credit risk is the leading source of risk for banks. And much of risk management is (should be) on the possibility of large losses (Duffie and Singleton, 2003) .
As motivated, the possibility of large losses stems from industry-wide shocks. And there is considerable supportive evidence in the literature reviewed in the next section. Many of these studies focus on the effects of fire-sales, whether of real assets or financial assets. Such forced asset sales at "dislocated" prices are found to occur because either the industry of the real-sector firm is financially constrained, or alternatively, because financial arbitrageurs that specialize in the trade of particular financial securities are encumbered.
A logical course that follows from this industry-specific starting point is whether industry shocks are exogenous or (at least partly) induced by economy-wide shocks. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether creditor recoveries depend on the macroeconomy in an economically important manner. The impact of the macroeconomy can be transmitted through either or both the economic-worth channel and the fire-sales channel. For example, an economy-wide recession reduces business opportunities, lowering the economic worth of defaulted firms' assets. Similarly, a recession can lead to widespread industry distress, lowering the liquidation value of assets further below their revised economic worth. Indeed, in the original model by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) , the shock is allowed to be economy-wide, not simply industry-wide, so that some firms are hit harder by a recession. The important point is that shocks not be idiosyncratic in nature. To date, however, empirical studies have found that while recovery rates covary with the macroeconomy, the relation becomes weak or insignificant 4 once other contract-, firm-, corporate-finance structure-, bond-market, and industry-specific factors are employed as explanatory variables.
This paper revisits this debate by reconciling industry distress with the macroeconomic state. The literature does not allow for the possibility that industries vary in the extent of their sensitivity to the business cycle, whether for fundamental or liquidity reasons. For example, business prospects may be more sensitive to economic downturns in some industries such as apparel and accessories than in others such as tobacco. Or from another angle, industries in the nontradable sector (such as legal services) may have a greater likelihood of falling into distress during recessions than the tradable sector (such as oil or mining).
The results of this paper show that macroeconomic effects do operate differentially via industry conditions. The analysis draws on about 40 years of recovery data on defaulted debt instruments and controls for a range of contract-, firm-, and industry-level characteristics.
Specifically, I find that industries whose sales growth is more correlated with GDP growth recover less during recessions. For example, when there is a recession, the industry at the 75 th percentile recovers roughly 7 cents less on a dollar compared with the industry at the 25 th percentile. This is an economically significant effect as it is comparable to the direct effect of industry distress of between 7-10 cents (and I confirm that the industry distress effect closely matches that in the study by Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan, 2007) . Similarly, recoveries in industries highly dependent on external finance increase with positive movements in the stock market. Moreover, the effects of direct proxies for industry distress and economic worth become weaker or insignificant once different industries are allowed to respond differently to the macroeconomy. Note that it is reasonable that in many cases industry distress may be independent of the state of the economy such as episodes of accounting fraud or regulatory and 5 technological changes. But the results indicate that economy-triggered industry conditions are also important drivers. 3 Finally, the macro-sensitive industry channel is robust to the inclusion of bond market conditions as well as macroeconomic conditions at the time of debt origination that have been respectively emphasized in previous studies. I also show that, in addition to the commonly examined factors of GDP growth and stock market returns, other macroeconomic factors are associated with hypothesized movements in industry conditions. These include house prices, interest rates, and credit spreads.
It is interesting to pause on the parallels of this research with a different research topic examining the determinants of cyclical fluctuations in the unemployment rate -whether these are due to aggregate demand shocks or to industry shifts. Abraham and Katz (1986) observe that aggregate demand fluctuations can be primarily responsible even if the unemployment rate is found to be positively related to cross-industry dispersion of employment growth. The idea also is that sectors differ in their sensitivity to the common aggregate demand shock.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews descriptive statistics of creditor recoveries together with the related literature. Section III describes the empirical methodology employed in this paper, which has an analogy to Rajan and Zingales (1998) .
Section IV examines the macroeconomic determinants of recovery rates, considering the role of industry distress and their interrelationships. Section V follows with additional results and robustness checks. Section VI concludes.
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II. The Determinants of Recovery Rates
II.1. Variation across Instrument
Much of credit risk analysis has been devoted to the likelihood of default with less attention paid to recovery or the loss given default (see, for example, Bluhm, Overbeck, and Wagner, 2003 , and the review in Altman, Resti, and Sironi, 2004) . A common assumption made is that recovery is a fixed recovery based on historical averages, such as between 40%-50% on debt issued by U.S. corporate borrowers and 25% on debt issued by sovereign borrowers (Das and Hanouna, 2009 ). For example, Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, and Strebulaev (2011) apply a long-run average loss rate of 50% and devote their analysis to the determinants of corporate bond defaults over a 150-year period. They find that macroeconomic factors such as GDP growth, stock returns, and stock return volatility are strong predictors of default rates. Figure 1 shows the distribution of recoveries for debt instruments issued by U.S. firms based on trading-price recovery on defaulted securities over roughly 40 years (Moody's Default Risk Service). 4 Recovery is measured by the market value of defaulted debt as a percentage of par, one month after default, and averaged 39.3% (standard deviation 29.1%). Also shown in the figure is the estimated probability density of recovery rates, which is somewhat bimodal, as also discussed by Schuermann (2005) . As a result, imposing a 40%-50% average recovery assumption can produce a misleading analysis of credit risk.
Therefore, another common approach is to apply a stochastic recovery rate. For example, a typical stochastic recovery is drawn from a beta distribution calibrated on the empirical mean 4 Trading price recovery measured soon after default is meant to proxy for eventual recovery on the defaulted debt when the issuer emerges from default. Moreover, this measure represents actual recovery for the many investors that sell their positions immediately following default. Note also that recoveries can be somewhat greater than 100% when the coupon on the debt is large relative to the prevailing term structure of interest rates. and variance as done by Pesaran, Schuermann, Treutler, and Weiner (2006) . 5 While the recovery rate is allowed to be stochastic, it is commonly assumed to be unsystematic, and therefore unrelated to factors like the default rate or the business cycle. This independence assumption considerably simplifies the portfolio loss analysis because the correlation between defaults and recoveries does not have to be modeled. Moreover, researchers disagree about the need to model a systematic recovery in practice. For example, some have argued that since the recovery rate represents the outcome of a bargaining process between the debtor and the creditor, it is reasonable to assume that it is unsystematic (Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995) .
Seniority, collateral, and industry type are also important in explaining the variation in recoveries (Table 1) . For example, bank loans have significantly greater recoveries (67.1%) than the next debt class of senior secured bonds (47.3%) (see also Khieu, Mullineaux, and Yi, 2012) .
Relative seniority, in addition to absolute seniority, is also an important determinant of recovery rates (Panel C of Table 1 ; see also Dwyer and Korablev, 2009) . For example, a subordinated bond may still occupy the top place in the seniority structure of debt claims on the borrower (compare the unconditional mean recovery on senior subordinated debt (30.5%) to the mean recovery conditional on top seniority (47.4%)). Whether the instrument is secured and whether a credit guarantee is provided by a third-party guarantor is also important. The empirical analysis controls for all these factors.
II.2. Variation through Time
5 Applying a beta distribution to recovery rates has become a common industry practice because of a number of advantages, including it is 1) parsimonious as only two parameters (mean and variance) are needed; 2) bounded between 0 and 1; and 3) can be asymmetric and fat-tailed. However, the beta distribution cannot be bimodal and does not allow for concentrations at specific recoveries, such as zero or 100 percent. Note, however, that even though the instrument-level distribution is bimodal, the firm-level recovery distribution may be unimodal because each firm has several seniority classes of debt with different recoveries (Carey and Gordy, 2009 ).
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Recovery rates are also characterized by considerable time variation. A stylized fact is that the recovery rate is inversely related to the aggregate default rate (Figure 2 Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, and Strebulaev (2011) highlight the clustered nature of corporate bond default events at various times over the longer historical period they examine, including the railroad crisis of 1873-75, the banking panics of the late 1800s, and the Great Depression.
One reason for the inverse relation between the recovery rate and the default rate comes from common dependence on a systematic factor such as the business cycle. For example, the same adverse economic conditions that depress recoveries as discussed in the introduction also cause defaults to rise. Evidence that the recovery rate is procyclical is shown in Figure 3 . The shaded areas are the periods of recessions as dated by the National Bureau of Economic
Research. As is evident, the aggregate recovery rate closely tracks the business cycle. For 6 Specifically, the default rate is the weighted average default rate on securities in the high-yield market in the United States (underlying data are instrument-level data from the Moody's DRS database). Weights are based on the face value of all high-yield (sub-investment grade) securities outstanding each year (measured at midyear) and the size of each defaulting issue within a particular year. The recovery rate is the aggregate annual weighted average recovery on all defaulted U.S. corporate securities. The weights are based on the defaulted debt amounts. 7 The 1982 peak in the default rate is less reliable because there was less outstanding high-yield debt in the 1970s and early 1980s. In addition, while 2008-09 saw a marked increase in the default rate from preceding years, the default rate peaked at a lower rate than observers expected at the beginning of the financial crisis. The default cycle was also short-lived, falling from a 10.8% default rate in 2009 to an average 1.3% in 2010-11 (Altman and Kuehne, 2011; Moody's and Fitch Ratings recent reports) . One reason that defaults were fewer than expected is that the corporate sector was not at the center of the financial crisis (The Economist, 2010) . Another reason may be that creditors such as banks wanted to avoid uncoordinated defaults and associated depressed recoveries. For example, there is evidence of reduced corporate restructurings and a practice of "extend and amend", or more pessimistically, "extend and pretend" (Financial Times, 2012) . The choice of calling for default depends on creditors' incentives, in addition to those of borrowers.
example, the recovery rate is positively correlated with real GDP growth (correlation coefficient equal to 0.45 over 1978-2010) . Previous studies also document a similar macroeconomic dependence, whereby recessions depress bond recoveries by up to one-third from normal-year averages Schuermann, 2005 ; Figure 3 ).
Nonetheless, a common thread in recent papers is that macroeconomic conditions do not matter in explaining recovery rates on defaulted securities once other conditions are considered.
There are several competing alternatives.
One view is that illiquidity in the financial market for the sale of defaulted securities is mainly responsible for the time-series variation. Altman, Brady, Resti, and Sironi (2005) therefore examine the relation of recoveries to conditions in the distressed bond market, motivated by the previously-discussed Figure 2 . 8 They argue that the recovery rate is a function of the supply and demand for defaulted securities, so that when the supply of defaulted bonds goes up, secondary market prices are driven down. This result relies on a somewhat inelastic demand in the distressed bond market. Such a condition may arise when investor capacity to absorb defaulted securities is limited. For example, only specialized investors such as vulture funds and hedge funds may be willing to buy distressed debt and other investors do not arbitrage away price differences in this segmented market. Therefore, in high default years when distressed debt is in excess supply relative to typical investor capacity, secondary market prices fall to equilibrate the market. For example, during the 1990-91 and 2000-01 periods, the ratio of 8 Even ruling out common dependence on a credit cycle, the first generation structural model of credit risk developed by Merton (1974) (and extended by others) leads to a simple negative relationship between the likelihood of default and recovery (as discussed by Altman, Resti, and Sironi, 2004) . In Merton's model, default occurs when the market value of the firm's assets falls below its liabilities. Therefore, to the extent that the likelihood of default goes up when the market value of the firm's assets goes down (or when leverage goes up), recovery will decline too. Further, increased asset volatility will mean a greater chance that realized asset values fall below the debt level, triggering default (and in later extensions of the structural model, a jump into default). In these cases, it is plausible that the recovery rate will also be low. Therefore, the main innovation in Altman et al (2005) was to model the inverse relation as a function of a common state variable, not isolated to a firm's structural characteristics.
the supply to the demand for distressed and defaulted securities reached 10-to-1 (Altman, Brady, Resti, and Sironi, 2005) . See also a more recent discussion of dislocations in the European distressed debt market as banks are expected to shift their troubled assets to hedge funds (Financial Times, 2013) .
The recent review by Shleifer and Vishny (2011) Coval and Stafford (2007) show evidence of negative future returns on the stocks held by weak funds that were forced to sell these in response to investor withdrawals. Individual bond liquidity also matters (Jankowitsch, Nagler, and Subrahmanyam, 2013) . They find that less liquid bonds (as measured by price dispersion of their trades) recover less, controlling for a range of other factors.
II.3. Industry Conditions and Fire-Sales
More closely related to the hypothesis in this paper, the alternative view is that illiquidity in the market for the sale of real assets and not illiquidity in the market for the sale of financial assets primarily determines liquidation values. Following from Shleifer and Vishny (1992) introduced earlier, a number of studies have directly examined asset sales. A classic example is the sale of used airplanes by distressed airlines, where the asset is highly specific to the airline industry. This forces distressed airlines to sell used aircraft at discounts to fundamental values when financial conditions of the airline industry-cohort are also poor (Pulvino, 1998 Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) take this approach and find that the relation between creditor recoveries and industry-wide distress is consistent with the anticipation of fire-sale prices. This is in addition to the lower expected profitability of a defaulted firm's assets coming from the industry downturn (proxied by industry median Q).
While Acharya et al find that macroeconomic conditions (and bond market illiquidity conditions) are no longer significant in the presence of industry-specific conditions, Dieckmann, Spencer and Strickland (2007) and Thorburn (2000) find somewhat different results. For example, Dieckmann et al examine recoveries from the 1920s and find that the aggregate business failure rate remains significant in the presence of industry distress. Thorburn (2000) examines the downturn in Sweden in 1991. She finds a significant effect from the downturn, whereas the measure for industry distress is not. In all of these papers, however, industry distress is treated separately from the macroeconomic state. 9 One reason why Thorburn may have found a strong macroeconomic effect is because Scandinavia was hit by an acute recession and a credit crunch at the time, with the end result being a costly government rescue of the banking system. This extreme economic state may have swamped differential industry effects, as all industries were materially affected (her sample runs from 1988 to 1991). Differential dependence becomes visible with greater time series and industry variation, which this paper provides.
II.4. Other Conditions
Briefly, more recent papers have each placed emphasis on a different firm-specific hypothesis. For example, Carey and Gordy (2009) show that the recovery rate on a firm's assets will depend on the debt structure of the firm entering bankruptcy. The choice of bank debtholders' to call for liquidation depends on the size of their claim relative to firm value. If bank loans are most of the firm's debt, banks can force bankruptcy filing sooner and take control when firm value is not far below the insolvency point (since banks bear most of the losses as insolvency worsens). Banks have greater access to information by monitoring borrower deposits, cash flows, and covenant compliance. In contrast, if the bank-debt share is small, the firm is more likely to be deeply insolvent at the time of filing, and thus its recovery will be low.
Also emphasizing the special role of loan covenants in protecting creditors is Zhang (2010). He shows that loan covenants are set more strictly during downturns. This implies a negative relation between recoveries and macroeconomic conditions prevalent at the time of debt origination, controlling for macroeconomics conditions at the time of default. Donovan, Frankel, and Martin (2013) tie creditor recoveries to the extent of a firm's accounting conservatism. Covitz and Han (2004) focus instead on a Merton structural form explanation of recoveries (see footnote 8). They find that firms that "jump into default" such as those experiencing large negative shocks from accounting fraud, tort or regulatory changes are also associated with significantly depressed recovery rates. One example is health-care providers that 13 were hit by a reduction in cash flows from changes to Medicare reimbursements caused by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.
To summarize, while recent papers have expanded what we know about asset liquidations and recoveries, each offers a different conclusion. In almost none of these views does the aggregate state of the economy play a leading role.
III. The Empirical Framework and Data
The recovery rate is related to the macroeconomic state and the dependence of the defaulted borrower's industry on the macroeconomy. The basic multivariate empirical specification takes the form:
where Recovery is the recovery rate on debt instrument i issued by borrower j. The coefficient vector θ captures the economic effect of borrower j's industry sensitivity to the macroeconomy and is of special interest. The empirical method employed in this paper is closest in spirit to Rajan and Zingales (1998) . They find that industries more dependent on external finance grow more in countries with developed financial markets. By a similar analogy, recovery rates in industries that are more dependent on external finance are expected to be more sensitive to movements in the stock market for example. The two main macroeconomic variables are the standard ones employed in this literature, GDP growth and stock market returns. Additional factors such as house price are also evaluated.
I control for contract characteristics, X i , for borrower characteristics one year prior to default, Y j , and for seniority, backing, and industry dummies. I also augment this basic specification with industry distress and other industry conditions to evaluate the robustness and 14 relative contribution of the industry macro-channel. I also employ the aggregate bond default rate and other factors to test alternative hypotheses in the literature. The industry variables and contract-and firm-specific controls follow closely those in Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) , Zhang (2010) , and other recent papers. Similar to these papers, the data structure can be described as pooled cross-sections over time to which ordinary least squares estimation can be applied. Robustness checks are conducted on alternative nonlinear models such as quasimaximum likelihood estimation following Papke and Wooldridge (1996) . Finally, standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity, where the individual error terms are allowed to be correlated for all debt instruments of the same borrower.
The primary data source is Moody's Default Risk Service Database. As mentioned in the previous section, the measure of recovery is market recovery based on the trading prices of defaulted securities soon after the default event occurs (roughly 30 days). 10 While this measure may be an imperfect proxy of recovery, it has the advantage of being observed soon after default and, therefore, represents investors' anticipated recovery. Moreover, since many investors sell (or mark-to-market) debt instruments once default occurs, market price recovery represents actual recovery for many investors (Covitz and Han, 2004) . Recovery and default data are for borrowers domiciled in the United States in order to match with firm characteristics from
Compustat. Defaulted borrowers were carefully matched by hand with Compustat identifiers.
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Summary statistics on recovery rates were discussed in the previous Section II.1.
Summary statistics on contract, firm, industry, and the macroeconomic variables of interest are shown in Table 2 . Contract characteristics include the coupon rate and the issue size in addition to various seniority and security dummies discussed previously. 12 Following the literature, firmlevel characteristics are measured one fiscal year before default and are mostly from Compustat.
These include the profit margin, leverage, asset tangibility (property, plant and equipment), and total asset size. Intuitively, the greater a firm's profitability and asset tangibility the higher the recovery expected on its claims because the firm is more valuable to would-be buyers. Higher leverage is typically associated with greater financial distress costs and therefore can be expected to reduce recoveries. Total assets proxy for firm size whose effect is ambiguous ex ante (e.g., a more complex firm has greater bankruptcy costs but may be characterized by smaller information asymmetry problems). Finally, the number of a firm's issues and its debt concentration (Herfindahl measure) proxy for creditor coordination problems and are calculated from the underlying Moody's data.
The next group of explanatory variables is industry characteristics based on the median values for firms in the 2-digit SIC industry of the defaulted firm (robustness checks were also 11 Specifically, of the 1,307 defaulting U.S. issuers in Moody's DRS over the sample 1970-2008 (and associated with the 4,422 instruments in Table 1 ) I was able to hand-match 1,146 of these issuers to Compustat identifiers (gvkey). I also confirmed through online searches on a random sample that the unidentifiable issuers were privatelyheld companies. Also note that the baseline sample in the regressions is further constrained by the availability of recorded recovery prices on the instruments (and non-missing covariates). This implies that the baseline sample in the regression tables is composed of 623 borrowers associated with 1,849 instruments. 12 The effects of issue size and coupon rate are ex ante ambiguous. For example, a larger issue might be held by a larger stakeholder that has greater bargaining power. On the other hand, a larger issue might be associated with more creditors and coordination problems. Similarly, a higher coupon might be associated with higher recovery because it may be valuable to bondholders under certain default events (Jankowitsch et al, 2013) . Alternatively, the recovery rate might be decreasing in the coupon because by increasing the cash flow it affects the marginal continuation value of the debt (Carey and Gordy, 2009 ).
conducted on 3-digit SIC industries). Industry variables are constructed from Compustat data.
Industry Q and the industry distress indicator are time-varying and are measured in the year of default. The industry Q is the median of the ratio of the market value to book value of assets for all firms in the defaulted firm's industry. Higher values of this variable are meant to reflect favorable growth opportunities for a particular industry. Industry Q, therefore, can be employed to control for movements in the fundamental worth of a firm's assets in a particular industry.
Also following Acharya et al (2007) and common practice, industry distress is an indicator meant to capture adverse financial conditions in the firm's industry as a whole in a particular year (without attaching a cause). This variable is set equal to 1 if the median industry stock return is less than -30% and zero otherwise. To the extent that fire sales only occur when industry peers are also experiencing financial distress, this variable is introduced as a nonlinear term. 13 Roughly, 12% of the industry-year sample is in distress.
Of particular interest to the hypotheses in this paper are the next two industry variables, sales growth correlation and external finance dependence. The latter variable is familiar in corporate finance research and was introduced in Rajan and Zingales (1998) Table 2 is macroeconomicrelated. Following the literature, the two main aggregate factors are the annual real GDP growth rate and S&P 500 stock return.
IV. The Macroeconomic Sensitivity of Recovery Rates
IV.1. Evaluating Separately Industry Conditions and the Macroeconomy
The direct impact of industry distress and industry Q on recovery rates is shown in the first two columns of Table 3 . Widespread financial distress in a particular industry is found to depress the recovery rate by 10.62 percentage points in column (1), supporting an industry illiquidity view, controlling for industry Q and industry dummies in addition to other contract- 14 Rajan and Zingales are only interested in the manufacturing sector. I find broadly similar results when comparing my measure to theirs conditional on manufacturing. For example, tobacco (SIC 21) has the lowest external finance dependence and chemicals & allied products (SIC 28) have the highest dependence. While manufacturing industries are grouped by ISIC codes in their study, tobacco also ranks lowest and plastic products and drugs rank highest.
and firm-level variables. 15 The specification in the first column is comparable to the baseline model in Acharya et al (2007) . The main difference is that the data in the latter study are from S&P's (discounted) ultimate recoveries for a narrower time period ending in 1999, while the data in this paper are from Moody's and includes a wider cross-sectional and time-series sample.
Regardless of these differences, the relation between recoveries and distress is robust and stable; those authors find a similar impact of distress (about 11.1 cents less on a dollar). The specification in column (2) is identical to column (1) but replaces the 12 Moody's industry classification dummies with 2-digit SIC industry dummies (corresponding to 74 industries). The impact from industry distress is somewhat smaller (7.28) but still statistically significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, the greater number of controls for industry unique factors in column (2) also isolates a significant impact from variation in industry economic growth prospects. For example, a one standard deviation increase in industry Q is associated with a 6.79 percentagepoint increase in the recovery rate.
Briefly, the other controls have the hypothesized effects for the most part. For example, contract characteristics such as seniority and security are among the most important determinants of recovery rates. A firm's characteristics also shape the recovery outcome. For example, a onestandard-deviation increase in a firm's profit margin significantly increases recovery by over 4
percentage points. The greater number of issues that a firm has outstanding at the time of its default the greater the potential for coordination problems and thus lower recovery. Firm leverage and asset tangibility have expected effects but are not statistically significant in these specifications (leverage is significant in alternative models controlling for 3-digit SIC industry dummies; Table A1 ).
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The next four columns of Table 3 separately consider the effect of industry conditions and the macroeconomy. These models continue to include the 12 Moody's industry dummies simply for comparability purposes with Acharya et al. The models in subsequent tables control for 2-digit industry dummies particularly because I am interested in the interaction terms between conditions at this industry-level and economy-wide shocks. The main point in columns (3) and (4) for GDP growth (and columns (5) and (6) for stock returns) is that industry distress retains its significance in the presence of macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, these macroeconomic conditions are significant in the absence of industry conditions but not when the latter are controlled for. For example, a one-standard-deviation decrease in GDP growth reduces recovery by 2.17 percentage points but has no effect on recovery in the presence of industry shocks.
IV.2. Variation in Industry Dependence on the Business Cycle and the Stock Market
The models in Table 4 instead consider the possibility that industry distress at least partly depends on the aggregate state of the economy. Thus, the models in columns (3) and (4) allow for the possibility that industries vary in their sensitivity to the business cycle and some may be prone to fall into financial distress during recessions as previously motivated.
First, I show that recessions adversely affect recoveries more than the linear symmetric effect of GDP growth would imply -in a similar manner to the relation between industry distress 16 In other results I also confirm the finding in Acharya et al that industry distress (measured in various ways including lower industry coverage ratios, current ratio, and leverage) adversely impacts recoveries the most in industries with high asset specificity. Specific assets are measured by machinery and equipment over the sample (e.g., the airline industry is in the top 90 th percentile). Similar results are found for industries with fewer potential buyers of assets (i.e., industries with smaller number of peers). These results are available upon request. and median equity returns. The model in column (1) estimates the average relation between recovery rates and a recession indicator. For example, recoveries in years characterized by an economy-wide recession are close to 5 percentage points lower than otherwise, while the average effect exerted by GDP growth during recessions implies only about a 1.27 percentage-point lower recovery (follows from the result in Table 3 (4) when combined with a -1.37% average GDP growth in recessions). Therefore, this hints at possible fire-sales induced during recessions. (Table 3 (2)).
The model in column (4) also includes median industry Q and industry distress to directly control for industry shifts in fundamental asset values and for illiquid industries. The coefficient on the interaction term of the recession and industry sales correlation remains statistically significant at the 5% level and with a similar economic effect. While the estimated effect is somewhat lower (6 percentage points), the results indicate that a meaningful part of industry illiquidity and fundamental values is arguably induced by poor macroeconomic conditions. Note also that the statistical and economic significance of industry Q and distress are reduced (e.g., distress is significant at the 10% level and its magnitude is 12% smaller). One caveat is that 21 while industry distress may be driven by the business cycle, the distress indicator may still perform better in a predictive sense because it is a more precisely measured summary indicator.
There is also evidence that those industries which are relatively more dependent on external finance recover more when the stock market return increases (Table 5 ). For example, the 75 percentile sector (business services) recovers 2.54 percentage points more compared with the 25 percentile sector (food & kindred products; forestry) when the S&P 500 annual return increases from -1.5% to 20.3% (from its 25 percentile to 75 percentile) based on the interaction term in column (3). Note also that stock market shocks have a similar positive impact on recoveries in industries with higher external equity dependence but the effect is not statistically significant. This measure was also introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and ranks industries by the ratio of the net amount of equity issued to capital expenditures. While it correlates positively with the broader measure of external finance dependence, the latter variable appears to better capture an industry's vulnerability to equity market shocks.
The last two columns of Table 5 illustrate that the impact of equity market shocks is also nonlinear so that adverse shocks to the equity market put more downward pressure on recoveries than the effect from the continuous measure. Unlike recessions, there is no commonly agreed measure for bad times. Nonetheless, stock market "crashes" can be proxied by periods in which the stock return was in the bottom 10 percentile. This has parallels to the industry distress measure because the industry distress indicator is set to 1 when the industry equity return is less than -30%, which is roughly at the bottom 10 percentile of industry-year observations. In this case, the coefficient on the interaction term of the stock crash with industry external finance dependence implies that the 75 th percentile sector has a 5.52 percentage-point lower recovery than the 25 th percentile sector when the market crashes. Similarly, the proxy for adverse equity 22 market shocks applied in the model in column (5) is based on the upper 10 percentile of stock market return volatility, measured as in Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, and Strebulaev (2011) .
Therefore, a plausible case can be made for the view that the state of the business cycle exerts an important influence on recoveries and at least part of this transmission shows up indirectly through industry distress and resulting fire sales of real assets. Liquidated asset values and recovery prices are therefore likely to be dislocated in industries less immune to recessions and stock market shocks when these shocks do occur. Table 6 The last two columns of Table 6 show that the results are robust to alternative hypotheses. Column (3) also controls for macroeconomic conditions at the time origination of the debt instrument. This model and variations on it are supportive of Zhang (2010) who finds a negative dependence between lagged macroeconomic conditions and subsequent recoveries because credit standards are more conservative in bad times. Column (4) controls for the 17 Note that the results are also similar when the stock return shock is replaced by its nonlinear representation. For example, the coefficient on the interaction term of a stock crash with an industry's dependence on external finance is -9.55, also significant at the 1% level in a model similar to column (1). Similarly, replacing the recession indicator with GDP growth in column (1) produces a positive but statistically insignificant effect (2.36) on the interaction term. Employing instead greater variation in GDP growth (annualized quarterly rates of growth in the quarter of default) is associated with a larger effect (6.16 significant at the 11% level Finally, alternative specifications aggregated at the industry-level are presented in Table   7 . In these models, the dependent variable is the industry (2-digit) annual weighted recovery rate, constructed in a similar way to the aggregate recovery rate shown in Figures 2 and 3 . The recovery rate in the previous tables was at the instrument-level and therefore various contractand firm-level variables were employed as controls. There are advantages and disadvantages to each representation. For example, aggregating at the level of industry reduces the impact of particular firm outliers and provides a more balanced industry-year sample. Interestingly, in this more balanced sample, the interaction term of GDP growth with industry sales growth correlation has a larger economic effect (6.72; p-value 0.105) than in the previous models. But its impact does not hold up to the direct measure of industry distress. In contrast, just as in the previous models, an adverse business cycle shock represented by the interaction term of 18 Results are similar when the author-computed aggregate default rate is replaced directly with the measure reported in Altman and Kuehne (2011) . 19 In other results on the type of default and the choice of creditors to call for default, I confirm that recoveries are higher for distressed exchanges (out-of-court restructuring). I also find that the time remaining to maturity at default is negatively related to recoveries as in Carey and Gordy (2009) . And that a higher share of bank debt in a bank's total debt outstanding at the time of default is associated with lower recovery. This last finding differs from Carey and Gordy. It may be because the data on market price recoveries does not capture well this dimension of ultimate recoveries. Or it may be because the recovery data are instrument-level, not firm-level, so that even though banks may force bankruptcy when firm value is not far below the insolvency point, a higher bank share may imply lower recoveries for the lower priority bondholders. This question is outside the scope of this paper but may be interesting to explore in the future. In all these tests, the main results on macroeconomic dependence retain their economic and statistical significance.
recessions with industry cyclicality retains its significance in the presence of industry distress (column (4)). Indeed, industry distress is rendered insignificant in these models. Similarly, significantly adverse stock market shocks depress recoveries. These results are therefore also supportive of illiquidity-induced effects from the macroeconomy to vulnerable industries.
V. Additional Results and Robustness Tests
Other macroeconomic factors such as house prices, interest rates and credit spreads are associated with hypothesized movements in industry conditions. The results are presented in Table 8 (in which all the contract-and firm-level controls are also included in the regressions but not shown in the interest of space). Care should be taken not to overinterpret these results, especially as these factors are less commonly examined in this literature than growth and stock returns are. Nonetheless, there are some interesting findings. For example, positive shocks to house prices are associated with higher recoveries in industries that depend on property. 20 The effect is statistically insignificant for nation-wide house price variation (column (1)) but significant at the 1% level for more local house price movements (state-level in column (2)).
This is an intuitive result because property markets are more locally segmented than financial markets such as the stock market. I also construct a measure of industry external debt finance dependence (based on the ratio of net debt issuance to capital expenditures) to test whether these industries are more sensitive to interest rate and credit spread shocks. The findings are indicative, especially for credit spread shocks that are robust to the inclusion of other macroeconomic factors unlike shocks to risk-free rates such as the Treasury bill rate and other Treasury yields (columns (3) to (6)). This adds further weight to the importance of illiquidity shocks in the economy. For example, a 100 basis-point shock to commercial spreads (similar to that in the recent financial crisis) reduces recoveries by about 2 percentage points in the 75 th percentile debt-dependent sector (real-estate) compared with the 25 th percentile sector (eating and drinking places).
The Appendix Tables A1 and A2 show the results of additional robustness tests. The models in Table A1 are evaluated for 3-digit SIC industries. And the models in Table A2 present alternative nonlinear models to the ordinary least squares models. The estimates and significance are similar when applying Tobit estimation, logistic or beta transform of the recovery rate, or when estimating a quasi-maximum likelihood (MLE) model. 21 One advantage of quasi-MLE for a fractional dependent variable discussed in Papke and Wooldridge (1996) is that the dependent variable is bounded between zero and one and it does not use ad hoc transformations to deal with observations at the extreme values. In any case, the marginal effects produced by this model are similar to least squares. For example, the marginal effect evaluated at the sample means of the regressors is -55.5 for the business cycle interaction term and 0.235 for the stock return interaction term, similar to the effects in the baseline model Table 6 (2). Also reported in the lower panel of Table 3 (2) with the macroeconomic factors in Table 6 (2) (RMSE falls from 35.4 to 28.1).
VI. Conclusion
The hypothesis motivating this paper was that the state of the macroeconomy at the time of default should be an economically important determinant of asset liquidation valuesincluding anticipated values -and therefore of creditor recoveries. But there is no reason to expect that its effect should be uniform across firms in different industries. Empirical evidence can, therefore, mask its importance if macroeconomic effects are included without considering the industry-channel through which the macroeconomy operates. It is to this end that this paper contributes, pinpointing how industries that are most susceptible to a macroeconomic downturn yield depressed creditor recoveries. This result is compatible with the industry-equilibrium view developed by Shleifer and Vishny (1992) and contributions in the field by Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) , among others.
One implication of this paper that was touched on in the introduction is the need to consider the aggregate state, industry conditions, and their interactions in the modeling of credit risk. See Mora (2012) for a simplified discrete credit loss problem that illustrates how unexpected loss can be magnified when the recovery rate is positively related to the state of the business cycle. In related work, Altman, Brady, Resti and Sironi (2005) and Bruche and Gonzalez-Aguado (2010) simulate losses on a representative credit portfolio comparing the case when default probabilities and recoveries are assumed to be uncorrelated with the case where they are correlated (assumed to commonly depend on a latent credit cycle in Bruche and Gonzalez). They find that potential large losses are understated in the uncorrelated case by 30%-40%. Therefore, failing to adequately consider common dependence can lead to the underestimation of the capital buffer required to cover unexpected losses, which in turn results in adverse feedback on the economy. The industry percentiles are reported in Table 2 and the baseline model is reported in Table 6 (2). 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 7 Relative Seniority statistics are computed for the securities that are at the top of the firm issuer's capital structure at the time of default.
Note that some securities are missing an industry SIC code or a seniority type in Moody's DRS. And that not all defaulted securities are reported with a recovery rate (only 2,952 of the 4,422 total defaulted securities in the sample). Rajan and Zingales (1998) . For particular contract and firm variable definitions, see Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) . For example, Log (assets) is the natural log of total assets; Profit Margin is the ratio of EBITDA to sales; Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets; Tangibility is the ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to total assets; Number of Issues is the total number of debt issues outstanding at the time of a firm's default; Debt Concentration is the Herfindahl index measure by amount of the debt issues outstanding at the time of a firm's default. Industry Q is the median of the ratio of market value to book value of all firms in the industry of the defaulting firm (where market value is measured as book value of total assets -book value of equity + market value of equity). The Industry Distress Indicator equals one if the median stock return of all firms in the industry of the defaulting firm in the year of default is less than -30%, and zero otherwise. Industry Sales Growth Correlation is the median of the correlation of sales growth and real GDP growth in the industry of the defaulting firm. Industry External Finance Dependence is the median of capital expenditures minus total funds from operations scaled by capital expenditures in the industry of the defaulting firm. The method and codes are described in detail in Rajan and Zingales (1998) . Industry External Debt Finance Dependence is the median of long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction scaled by capital expenditures in the industry of the defaulting firm. Industry Property Dependence is the median of the sum of buildings, land, and construction-in-progress to total assets of firms in the industry of the defaulting firm. Finally, GDP Growth is real gross domestic product annual growth from the Bureau of Economic Analysis via FRED. Stock Return is the annual return on the S&P 500 composite stock index from CRSP or from the Chicago Board Options Exchange. House Price Growth measures are, respectively, nationwide and state-level annual growth of house prices from the FHFA using all transactions indexes. Finally, the Treasury Bill Rate and the Commercial Paper Spread are from the Federal Reserve H.15 Release, where the commercial paper spread is the 3 month commercial paper rate for high grade nonfinancial borrowers minus the 3 month Treasury bill rate.
(1) The dependent variable is the security-level recovery rate
The models are estimated using OLS. The ommitted seniority category is junior subordinated. The Moody's 12 industry classification dummies are similar to the S&P 12 industry dummies included in the regressions in Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) . Note that ***, **, *, indicate 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are robust to heteroscedasticity, clustered at the firm level (Compustat gvkey), and are shown in parentheses. The models are estimated using OLS. The Moody's 12 industry classification dummies are similar to the S&P 12 industry dummies included in the regressions in Acharya, Bharath, and Srinivasan (2007) . Note that ***, **, *, indicate 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are robust to heteroscedasticity, clustered at the firm level (Compustat gvkey), and are shown in parentheses. All the seniority and backing dummies shown in Table 3 are included in these regressions but are not shown in the interest of space. Also note that the "Industry Sales Growth Correlation" variable is a 2-digit SIC variable and is, therefore, subsumed in the 2-digit industry dummies. The Recession indicator is one in recession years and zero otherwise.
(1) The models are estimated using OLS. Note that ***, **, *, indicate 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are robust to heteroscedasticity, clustered at the firm level (Compustat gvkey), and are shown in parentheses. All the seniority and backing dummies shown in Table 3 are included in these regressions but are not shown in the interest of space. Also note that the "Industry External Finance Dependence" variable is a 2-digit SIC variable and is therefore subsumed in the 2-digit industry dummies. The "Stock Crash" indicator is one in years where the stock market return is in the lower 10th percentile, and the "High Volatility" indicator is one in years where the stock market return volatility is in the upper 10th percentile (measured by the volatility of the 12 monthly stock market returns for each year following Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer, and Strebulaev, 2011) . The models are estimated using OLS. Note that ***, **, *, indicate 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are robust to heteroscedasticity, clustered at the firm level (Compustat gvkey), and are shown in parentheses. All the seniority and backing dummies shown in Table 3 are included in these regressions but are not shown in the interest of space.
(1) Altman et al (2005) . Also note that the "Industry Sales Growth Correlation" variable and the "Industry External Finance Dependence" variable are included in these regressions (with the exception of column (7) where they are redundant). Note that ***, **, *, indicate 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are robust to heteroscedasticity, clustered at the 2-digit SIC industry level, and are shown in parentheses. The models are estimated using OLS. Note that ***, **, *, indicate 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are robust to heteroscedasticity, clustered at the firm level (Compustat gvkey), and are shown in parentheses. All the seniority and backing dummies in addition to all the other contract and firm characteristics shown in Table 3 are included in these regressions but are not shown in the interest of space. The models are estimated using OLS. Note that ***, **, *, indicate 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are robust to heteroscedasticity, clustered at the firm level (Compustat gvkey), and are shown in parentheses. All the seniority and backing dummies shown in Table 3 are included in these regressions but are not shown in the interest of space. Note that the industry variables in these regressions are measured at the 3-digit SIC industry-level (Industry Q, Industry Distress, Industry Sales Growth Correlation, and Industry External Finance Dependence).
(1) (2) (3) Table 6 (2). Note that ***, **, *, indicate 1, 5, and 10 percent statistical significance, respectively. The standard errors used in calculating significance levels are robust to heteroscedasticity, clustered at the firm level (Compustat gvkey), and are shown in parentheses. All the seniority and backing dummies shown in Table 3 are included in these regressions but are not shown in the interest of space. The reported RMSE is the root mean square error from out-of-sample testing on 1996-2008. The initial sample period is 1970-1995 and rolling one-year ahead predicted recovery rates and RMSE are calculated for each subsequent year. The average RMSE over the forecast horizon is shown. Also shown is the out-of-sample RMSE for the comparable OLS model 6(2) and the OLS model 3(2) without macroeconomic factors.
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